AI Security Atlas › All entries › RAG & Knowledge Retrieval Security

ThreatHigh severity

Unauthorized Document Exfiltration

RAG answers or agent tools leak restricted documents to users who lack ACL entitlement.

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Impact

Confidential IP, PII, or regulated records leave the trust boundary through natural-language answers.

Why this severity

Impact High × Likelihood Medium = High

Impact high: confidential data leaves the boundary. Likelihood medium: zero-click exfiltration was demonstrated against M365 Copilot and Slack AI, but not catalogued as an in-the-wild incident.

Impact High: Code execution, credential compromise, exposure of regulated or confidential data, irreversible actions, or system-wide failure.
Likelihood Medium: Publicly demonstrated against real products or in peer-reviewed research, or seen in the wild only with a prior foothold such as stolen credentials.

Method: OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

Evidence

Related

Exploits

Mitigated by

Remediation

  1. Enforce document-level ACLs at retrieval time, not only at UI login.
  2. Redact PII in outputs with policy-aware filters.
  3. Block citation of documents outside the requester's clearance.

How to verify

Framework mapping

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025

MITRE ATLAS

NIST AI RMF 1.0