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ThreatHigh severity

Output-Rendered Data Exfiltration

Injected instructions make the model emit markdown images, links, or HTML that leak context to attacker URLs when rendered.

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Impact

Chat history, documents, or tokens are sent to an attacker server with zero user clicks.

Why this severity

Impact High × Likelihood Medium = High

Impact high: zero-click data theft. Likelihood medium: demonstrated against ChatGPT, Bard, M365 Copilot, and Lenovo's chatbot; vendors patched the reported paths.

Impact High: Code execution, credential compromise, exposure of regulated or confidential data, irreversible actions, or system-wide failure.
Likelihood Medium: Publicly demonstrated against real products or in peer-reviewed research, or seen in the wild only with a prior foothold such as stolen credentials.

Method: OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

Evidence

Related

Exploits

Mitigated by

Remediation

  1. Never auto-load remote images or iframes from model output.
  2. Restrict rendered link targets to an allowlist of domains.
  3. Treat model output as untrusted input to the frontend.

How to verify

Framework mapping

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025

MITRE ATLAS

NIST AI RMF 1.0