AI Security Atlas › All entries › Autonomous Agent & MCP Security
Excessive Tool Permissions
MCP tools and agent connectors inherit broad OAuth scopes or filesystem rights far beyond the task need.
Open in the interactive atlas →Impact
A single compromised tool call inherits admin-level reach across mail, cloud storage, and CI.
Why this severity
Impact High × Likelihood High = Critical
Impact high: one bad call inherits broad reach. Likelihood high: an over-scoped token let an attacker plant destructive agent code in the Amazon Q extension (2025 incident), and broad scopes are the connector default.
Impact High: Code execution, credential compromise, exposure of regulated or confidential data, irreversible actions, or system-wide failure.
Likelihood High: At least one documented real-world incident, and the attack needs no access beyond what the system exposes to ordinary users or content (publishing to a public registry counts as ordinary).
Method: OWASP Risk Rating Methodology
Evidence
- Incident: Code to Deploy Destructive AI Agent Discovered in Amazon Q VS Code Extension (MITRE ATLAS case study AML.CS0047, 2025)
- Demonstration: Claude Code GitHub Action Secret Exposure (MITRE ATLAS case study AML.CS0067, 2026)
Related
Exploited by
- Agent Tool Hijacking Threat · High severity
- Unbounded MCP Tool Calls Threat · Medium severity
- Rogue or Compromised Agent Threat · High severity
Mitigated by
- MCP Permission Scoping Guardrail · Fixes critical risks
Remediation
- Issue narrowly scoped tokens per tool capability.
- Prefer ephemeral credentials minted at invocation time.
- Deny-by-default filesystem and network egress for sandboxed runtimes.
How to verify
- Enumerate effective scopes in a pre-deploy permission report.
- Attempt out-of-scope API calls and expect hard denials.
Pattern
const token = mint({ scopes: tool.requiredScopes, ttl: '90s' });
Framework mapping
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025
- LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
- ASI03:2026 Identity and Privilege Abuse
MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
NIST AI RMF 1.0
- MAP 4.2 Internal risk controls for AI components are identified and documented