Deploying WireGuard Between IT and OT Zones
Module 2 · Zero-Trust Network Architecture with WireGuard

Deploying WireGuard Between IT and OT Zones

Step-by-step deployment of WireGuard VPN gateways on both sides of the OT DMZ, with key management, peer configuration, and connectivity verification.

Lab Environment

This lesson deploys WireGuard in a lab that mirrors the three-tier IT/OT architecture:

HostRoleIP (eth0)WG IP
it-gwIT-side WireGuard gateway192.168.1.1010.0.0.1/30
ot-dmz-gwOT DMZ WireGuard gateway192.168.2.1010.0.0.2/30
ot-historianSCADA historian (OT network)10.100.0.50—
it-historian-replicaRead-only replica (IT network)192.168.1.50—

All hosts run Ubuntu 22.04 LTS. The WireGuard tunnel (10.0.0.0/30) carries only historian sync traffic; all other cross-boundary flows are blocked at the OT DMZ gateway by iptables rules.


Step 1: Install WireGuard

Run on both it-gw and ot-dmz-gw:

sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y wireguard
# Verify kernel module is loaded
sudo modprobe wireguard && echo "WireGuard kernel module loaded"
# Confirm version
wg --version

Step 2: Generate Key Pairs

Each WireGuard peer has a private key (never leaves the host) and a public key (shared with peers). Generate them on each host separately.

On it-gw:

# Generate key pair with restricted permissions from the start
wg genkey | sudo tee /etc/wireguard/it-gw-private.key | \
  wg pubkey | sudo tee /etc/wireguard/it-gw-public.key
sudo chmod 600 /etc/wireguard/it-gw-private.key

# Print the public key — this goes into ot-dmz-gw's peer config
sudo cat /etc/wireguard/it-gw-public.key

On ot-dmz-gw:

wg genkey | sudo tee /etc/wireguard/ot-gw-private.key | \
  wg pubkey | sudo tee /etc/wireguard/ot-gw-public.key
sudo chmod 600 /etc/wireguard/ot-gw-private.key
sudo cat /etc/wireguard/ot-gw-public.key

Also generate a pre-shared key (PSK) on either host and securely copy it to both:

# Generate PSK (32 bytes, base64-encoded)
wg genpsk | sudo tee /etc/wireguard/it-ot-psk.key
sudo chmod 600 /etc/wireguard/it-ot-psk.key
# Copy to ot-dmz-gw via scp (use a secure channel, not email or Slack)
scp /etc/wireguard/it-ot-psk.key admin@ot-dmz-gw:/etc/wireguard/it-ot-psk.key

Step 3: Configure the IT Gateway

Create /etc/wireguard/wg0.conf on it-gw:

[Interface]
# IT gateway WireGuard IP
Address = 10.0.0.1/30
ListenPort = 51820
PrivateKey = <contents of it-gw-private.key>

# Enable IP forwarding for traffic to pass through this gateway
PostUp = iptables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT; iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
PostDown = iptables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT; iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE

[Peer]
# OT DMZ gateway
PublicKey = <contents of ot-gw-public.key>
PresharedKey = <contents of it-ot-psk.key>
# Only allow traffic destined for the OT historian through this tunnel
AllowedIPs = 10.100.0.50/32
# OT DMZ gateway's public endpoint
Endpoint = 192.168.2.10:51820
# Keep the tunnel alive across NAT devices
PersistentKeepalive = 25

Step 4: Configure the OT DMZ Gateway

Create /etc/wireguard/wg0.conf on ot-dmz-gw:

[Interface]
Address = 10.0.0.2/30
ListenPort = 51820
PrivateKey = <contents of ot-gw-private.key>

# Restrict forwarded traffic: IT historian replica may only reach OT historian port 8089
PostUp = iptables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -s 10.0.0.1 -d 10.100.0.50 -p tcp --dport 8089 -j ACCEPT; \
         iptables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j DROP
PostDown = iptables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -s 10.0.0.1 -d 10.100.0.50 -p tcp --dport 8089 -j ACCEPT; \
           iptables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j DROP

[Peer]
PublicKey = <contents of it-gw-public.key>
PresharedKey = <contents of it-ot-psk.key>
# Traffic allowed through this tunnel originates from the IT side
AllowedIPs = 10.0.0.1/32

Step 5: Start and Enable WireGuard

On both gateways:

# Start the interface
sudo wg-quick up wg0

# Verify the interface came up
ip addr show wg0

# Enable on boot
sudo systemctl enable wg-quick@wg0

Check tunnel status — a successful handshake appears within a few seconds of the first packet:

sudo wg show wg0
# Expected output includes:
# latest handshake: X seconds ago
# transfer: X bytes received, X bytes sent

Step 6: Verify Connectivity and Restriction

Confirm the historian sync path works, and that other OT destinations are blocked:

# FROM it-gw: historian port should be reachable
nc -zv 10.100.0.50 8089 && echo "PASS: historian sync port reachable"

# Any other OT IP or port should be blocked by the FORWARD rules
nc -zv 10.100.0.50 502 && echo "FAIL: Modbus reachable from IT" || echo "PASS: Modbus blocked"
nc -zv 10.100.0.10 22 && echo "FAIL: PLC SSH reachable from IT" || echo "PASS: PLC SSH blocked"
💻 Code Lab: Automated Tunnel Health Check

Add this script to cron on both gateways — it alerts if the WireGuard tunnel goes down or if the last handshake is older than 3 minutes (indicating a silent failure):

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# /usr/local/bin/wg-health-check.sh

PEER_PUBKEY="<ot-gw-public-key>"
MAX_HANDSHAKE_AGE=180  # seconds

last_handshake=$(wg show wg0 latest-handshakes | grep "$PEER_PUBKEY" | awk '{print $2}')
now=$(date +%s)
age=$(( now - last_handshake ))

if [ "$age" -gt "$MAX_HANDSHAKE_AGE" ]; then
  echo "ALERT: WireGuard tunnel to OT DMZ last handshake ${age}s ago — tunnel may be down"
  # Send to your SIEM or alerting pipeline
  logger -t wg-health "Tunnel stale: last handshake ${age}s ago"
  exit 1
fi

echo "OK: WireGuard tunnel healthy (last handshake ${age}s ago)"
# Add to crontab
echo "*/2 * * * * root /usr/local/bin/wg-health-check.sh" >> /etc/cron.d/wg-health

⚠️ Common Pitfall: Never Expose the WireGuard Endpoint Publicly Without Allowlisting

WireGuard’s stealth mode (not responding to unauthenticated packets) provides some protection, but UDP port 51820 should not be publicly internet-accessible on an OT gateway. If the WireGuard endpoint must traverse the internet (e.g., for a remote plant), place it behind a dedicated firewall that allowlists the IT gateway’s source IP at the UDP level before WireGuard authentication even occurs.

An attacker who discovers the WireGuard port and launches a volumetric UDP flood can exhaust the gateway’s bandwidth — an availability attack (FR 7 in 62443-3-3) that doesn’t require any cryptographic weakness.


Key Rotation Policy

WireGuard keys should be rotated on a schedule aligned with your security level:

Security LevelKey Rotation Cadence
SL 1Annually
SL 2Every 6 months
SL 3Every 90 days
SL 4Every 30 days or per-session

For SL 3+ environments, automate key rotation through HashiCorp Vault (covered in Module 3). Vault can generate new WireGuard key pairs, distribute them to the gateways, and update peer configurations — eliminating the manual rotation step that organizations routinely skip.


🧠 Knowledge Check

The OT DMZ WireGuard gateway's PostUp iptables rules drop all forwarded traffic not matching the historian rule. An attacker who has compromised the IT-side WireGuard gateway sends a Modbus TCP packet to 10.100.0.50:502 through the tunnel. What happens?

Reveal Answer & Explanation

The packet enters the WireGuard tunnel (authenticated, encrypted), decrypts at the OT DMZ gateway, and is evaluated by the FORWARD chain:

  1. Rule 1: FORWARD -i wg0 -s 10.0.0.1 -d 10.100.0.50 -p tcp --dport 8089 -j ACCEPT — destination port is 502, not 8089 → no match
  2. Rule 2: FORWARD -i wg0 -j DROP — matches; packet is dropped

The Modbus packet never reaches the OT network. The attacker has a valid WireGuard credential but cannot reach any OT device except the historian on port 8089.

This is the principle of least privilege applied at the network layer: WireGuard authenticates who can enter the tunnel, and iptables enforces where they can go inside it.


What’s Next

WireGuard tunnels are operational and the IT/OT conduit is authenticated and encrypted.

In Lesson 3, we layer Access Control Lists (ACLs) and identity-based policy on top of the network controls — defining per-user and per-device access grants that the WireGuard tunnels enforce.